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Abstract  child care for two worker families are a part of the
This study examined the supply of and demand for  current tax code.
married female labor in the southern United States.  As the number of jobs (labor demand) is increased
Special attention  was given to differences  in  labor  through policy manipulations, constraints to job de-
force participation,  labor supply,  and quantities  of  mand (labor supply) need to be investigated in order
labor supplied and demanded across rural and urban  to ensure effective increases in household incomes.
areas.  Once state effects were  accounted for, deci-  Factors affecting  the labor force participation,  and
sions to change participation were found not to vary  labor supply, of married females have been investi-
by urban-rural  designation.  Differences in demand  gated  in  depth  in  numerous  studies.  This  paper
were fully  captured  by an intercept  shifter and the  reexamines these factors or determinants formarried
variations in hours supplied by married females be-  women in the southern United States with a focus on
tween urban and rural areas.  Labor supply  varied  the differences in these determinants between urban
greatly with the effects of key determinants (number  and rural areas.
of children, work force experience,  family income)  Policymakers  need  to  know  whether  programs
being  strongly  different  in  rural  areas.  Different  which increase labor supplies (as either an intended
policies are needed to promote female labor supply  or unintended  outcome)  have different  impacts  in
in rural areas as opposed to urban areas.  rural  and urban areas.  Despite  this need,  there  is
little discussion in the literature of the differences in
the labor supply behavior of rural and urban married
Key words:  labor supply, labor demand, rural/  women, or among any  demographic  groups across
urban, simultaneous system  rural and urban designations.  These differences  are
either assumed not to  exist in studies lumping the
U~~-'^~~~~~~  ~two  groups  together,  or  assumed  to  lead to  com-
Potential increases in household incomes create a  pletely different structural  regimes in studies using
motivation for job creation and training programs.  only urban or only rural observations.
There is significant evidence that secondary sources  These assumptions have potentially serious draw-
of earned income are becoming more important for  backs.  In the first  case,  if the regimes  are indeed
households  everywhere.  Particularly in rural areas  different,  then misleading  results will be  obtained
it has been found that many families try to combat  when the differences are ignored because the coeffi-
poverty and stagnating wages by entering more than  cients  will  represent  averages  of urban  and  rural
one person  into the labor market (Summers et al.).  outcomes.  In the second  case, if the regimes  are
Female labor force participation has grown dramati-  similar, or their differences can be captured by inter-
cally  since the  1960s.  Increased job opportunities  cept shifters,  inefficiency  will result from ignoring
are a means of raising household incomes and pro-  portions of the sample.  This paper examines some
moting economic development in the United States.  of these possible differences and discusses their pol-
Technical  and  secondary  school  training  is  often  icy implications.
suggested  as  a means  of raising  productivity  and  There  is substantial  evidence that the labor force
income for second  earners.  The provision of child  behavior of married females is different in rural and
care is frequently examined as a means of promoting  urban areas.  Some of these differences are related to
married  female labor supply,  while  tax credits  for  differing demand patterns, though different propen-
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49sities to supply  labor may affect observed  equilib-  MODEL
rium quantities.  Nakamura et al. (1979) showed that  A standard neoclassical model of married female
job opportunities  for female workers varied widely  labor supply is used (see Heckman, 1974) to express
between urban and rural areas of Canada; Nakamura  hours supplied as a function of their determinants:
and Nakamura  (1981)  documented  similar  differ-
ences in nearly all the United States.  In addition to
these demand factors,  differences in fixed costs as-  hi  bo  W  )  b
sociated  with work,  and different  preferences  for
work  in rural  areas  may  cause  quantities  of labor  where  re(  )ho  woed  tei  ae
supplied to vary systematically  from urban to rural  female, Wfi is her offered wage rate  Z  is a set of
areas.  Recent  studies  show  deep  differences  be-  variables  affecting her asking  wage, ei is a random
tween rural and urban labor markets and conditions  disturbance,  and  bo, bl, bi  are the parameters  of the
(Summers  et al.), but these studies have not exam-  labor supply function.'  Zi* contains variables repre-
ined the impacts of these differences on labor supply  senting the number  of children in the family from
decisions.  different age groups, the husband's earned income,2
and the remaining household unearned  income.
Studies  of female labor force participation  have  The offered  age  i  o  ea  n i  in  n
generally  failed to consider the differences between  ee  ed  ecors of  ersona  a determined by vectors of personal and regional eco- rural and urban households.  Blank (1988), Blundell  nomic co  tos w  h dete  ne t  and for a et  al.,  Blau andobinanNakTa  nomic conditions which determine the demand for a
et  al.,  Blau and Robins,  and Nakamura  and Naka- etal.  an  Robins  and  and  particular woman's labor services, along with total
mura (1985) each used various models and data sets  pari  wo  o  oo
to  explain female  labor supply behavior.  None of  hours  An approximation of this demand may be written: these accounted for systematic differences in behav-
ior by allowing slopes to vary  from rural to urban
areas,  nor even included  intercept shifters.  Naka-  ()  n Wf  +  ZaE,  3
mura et al., though  documenting  large  differences
between  the behavior  of urban  and  rural  women,  here Z is a set of human capital variables affecting
only included an intercept shifter in their evaluation  the offered  wage (demand  factors),  E  are regional
of Canadian  data.  Only  Blundell  et al.  included  economic  characteristics,  and  a  ,  a'  2,  a'  are
variables  for  regional differences  (i.e.,  regions of  parameters  to be estimated.  Z  contains  variables
England);  however,  in their study,  no  distinctions  representing  the age,  education,  and  work experi-
were made between rural  and urban designations.  ence of the woman, while Ei  contains  Si, a set  of
All  of  the above  studies used  national  data  from  southern  state fixed effects  (dummy variables) and
representative samples which include bothurban and  Ri,  a  dummy  variable  for  SMSA  vs.  non-SMSA
rural observations.  residence.3
The specification of the simultaneous  system in
This  paper  reexamines  female  labor  supply  and  equations  (1)  and  (2)  is consistent with numerous
demand across urban and rural areas of the southern  alternative  studies.  It  says  that  the  supply  of
United States.  Specific attention is paid to structural  women's labor is a function of her offered wage, and
differences in labor force participation, and demand  factors  affecting  her desired  wage,  while  demand
for and supply across these areas.  The methodology  varies according to human capital characteristics and
employed permits  separation of these different as-  local demand shifters.  Both the supply and the de-
pects of labor force participation and provides infor-  mand  are simultaneously  determined,  and,  hence,
mation on how urban areas  differ from rural areas.  Wfi and hi enter the right-hand-sides of equations (1)
Implications of these findings for some of the policy  and (2), respectively.  This simultaneous treatment
issues described above are discussed.  of labor supply and demand is implicit in the numer-
1  See Stem for an exposition of how this functional form can be derived from utility maximization.  The h2 (underlined) notation
signifies that h2 is a vector of parameters.
2Notice that the wife's labor supply decisions are assumed to be conditioned on the prior decision of the husband.  There is a
large literature on the simultaneous nature of these decisions (see e.g. Lundberg);  however, the structure of the household decision
process is beyond the scope of this study.  Husband's Earned Income was instrumented with husband's age and age squared and the
parameters for each of the models remained essentially  unchanged.  This result is consistent with Mroz, who also found no evidence
of endogeneity of nonwife income.  This leads the authors to conclude that endogeneity of this variable is not a source of bias.
3  Si is a vector of state fixed effects.  For each observation  (i), one element of the Si vector equals one, depending on the state of
residence, and all other elements  are zero.  The SMSA vs. non-SMSA census bureau designation is used to distinguish urban vs.
rural residence,  Ri =  1 if from non-SMSA, 0 if from SMSA.
50ous studies examining  labor supply behavior while  The rather  standard  definition of Z,  Ei,  and  Z*
"controlling  for"  the  endogeneity  of  wages  (see  (see, e.g., Nakamura et al. and Nakamura and Naka-
Heckman  1974;  Nakamura  et  al.,  Nakamura  and  mura 1981)  contains the presumption  (imposed re-
Nakamura  1981).  The "endogeneity  of wages" re-  striction) that the state-specific dummy variables (Si)
suits because supply and demand are presumed to be  and rural  residence  (Ri)  only  affect  the supply  of
simultaneously  determined.  The rationale behind  labor through their impact on offered wages.  Thus,
this treatment is that in the aggregate neither wages  by using the restrictions from (5), hours supplied are
nor hours can be treated as fixed; they each affect the  functions  only of wages and Zi*,  while wages  are
other.  functions of hours, the state of residence, urban/rural
The relationship between  this theoretical  system  residence and Zi.
and empirical tests of how labor supply and demand  State effects or rural residence can, however, plau-
vary from rural to urban areas, and across states in  sibly have independent  effects on supply,  and there
the south, needs to be outlined.  Tests of structural  are  important  policy  implications  for  differential
differences  between  urban  and  rural  areas  are  supply behavior  between  states and place  of resi-
straightforward.  Using the r and u superscript  to  dence.  Some of these implications were mentioned
denote  parameter estimates  derived  from separate  above.  The (over-) identifying restrictions implicit
estimation of equations  (1)  and (2) using data from  in  (1) and  (2) need  to be carefully  examined  and
only rural and urban areas, respectively, tests of Br =  tested.
Bu (in equation 1) and Ar = Au (in equation 2) where  Separating the state effects  (Si) and rural residence
B  =  [bo,  bl, bi]'  and A =  [ao,  al,  a2,  a3]'  can  be  (Ri) from  Ei and considering  a different regime be-
conducted.  The results from these tests provide evi-  tween rural and urban residents,  (3)  and (4) can be
dence about structural  differences across urban and  rewritten:
rural areas.  (6) hi = bo + bor R  + bu In ( Wfi)  + b  In ( WFi ) * R,
- _.b'~  Z,*  + b'  Ri b'3uZi +  b3Z *  R The theory underlying  estimation of the equation  +  '  Z  + b'  Z  *  i b  + b'j Zi  * K
system  (1)  and (2)  can,  however,  be employed  to  + b'  Si + b5i  R  + i .
distinguish more  closely between those factors af-
fecting  labor supply  and those affecting  labor de-  Now, the basic  (over-)  identifying restrictions for
mand.  First,  notice that  equations  (1)  and (2)  are  (6) and (7) respectively are b3  = O  and a  = 0.
implicitly derived from the simultaneous system:
To achieve identification of  this system, the restric-  (7)  In Wi =  Xo + o R, + oa'u Zi + a'i Zi * Ri + ac'  Si
tions  + a'2 Si * Ri + a3 hi + a3 hi * RK  + oa' Z*
+ a4 Z  *  Ri + u
(3) hi = bo + bi In (Wfi)  + b'2 Zi  + b3 Zi + b'4  E + Ei, - - These restrictions  are imposed from the start.4 To
(4) In ( Wi  o  +  '  t+  '  examine  whether there  are  differences  in supplies
(4) ln  ( W  )  + a  Z  +  2 E  + x' 3 h  + a'4 Zi  not just  attributable  to  demand  differences  (i.e.,
+ ui, and  wages  offered)  between  states  and  from  rural  to
urban areas, the restrictions bu = 0,  bg  = 0,  br  = 0,
(5) [ b  = o,  b4' = o, and  4' = o ]  br  = 0, b  = 0, are jointly tested. Rejection of this test
of over-identifying  restrictions  will  provide  evi-
are  imposed, and Zi,  Ei,  and Z*  are used  as instru-  dence that labor supply  parameters  differ between
ments to identify the (endogenous) wages and hours.  rural and urban areas  and between  states.  Accep-
These over-identifying  restrictions are derived from  tance of the restrictions implies that urban/rural dif-
theory which says that Zi  and Ei,  the personal  and  ferences,  if they  exist,  only  affect  labor  supply
regional characteristics  affecting  the offered  wage,  through their effect on demand (wages).  Depending
only influence the hours supplied through their im-  on the results of these tests, further analyses of the
pacts on wages.  Similarly,  Zi*  only affects  actual  sources  of supply  differences  (if the restriction  is
wages through its impact on hours supplied.  rejected) can be conducted.
4Because Zi  and Zi* are vectors and only  exogenous variable needs to be deleted from each equation to achieve identification,
the restrictions  h3u = Q., l4U = Q  are over-identifying.  These over-identifying  restrictions will not be tested, because exclusion of any
one of these vector components is not logical; i.e., they should be excluded together.  The restrictions k3r = Q, s4r = Q  can also be
imposed at this point; however, they are instead tested.  The decision to impose h3u = Q, OC4U  = Q  is arbitrary, but some restriction is
necessary  to achieve  identification.
51The  demand  (wage)  side  of  the  model  can  be  reduced forms of (1) and  (2) and the standard errors
examined in a similar fashion.  Tests of oc = 0, a( =  of the estimates are adjusted accordingly.  The full
Q, ca =.Qf  and  (aX =  0 will  indicate  if wages  vary  selectivity model, as well as the nature of the correc-
systematically from urban to rural areas, or whether  ios to the standard errors needed  are presented in
any differences are solely attributable to differences  pp  231-276 of Maddala.
in supply propensities (hi).  The labor supply model contains three basic equa-
tions:  a participation equation, a wage equation, and
DATA  an hours-supplied  equation.  They are discussed in
logical order. The data used  for this study were taken from the
March  1979 Current  Population Survey (CPS).  In  Participation Equation
the  CPS, families were asked  a series  of questions  The probit female labor force participation  equa-
about their labor market experience  in the previous  tion  was estimated  separately  for the  SMSA/non-
week, and for information on household demograph-  SMSA groups.  This model (full model) includes all
ics.  In addition to this, in the March supplement  to  the variables  described  in Table  1.  In order to ac-
the CPS  (known as the Annual Demographic  File),  count for the regional factors found in Ei, the model
respondents were asked about labor force participa-  includes fixed state effects.  This precludes  the abil-
tion in  the previous  year,  husband's  earnings  and  ity to test the impact of unemployment  wages  and
family unearned  income.  From the national  data,  other variables  usually measured at the state level.
33,854  single-family  households  were  identifiede  However,  the  influence of these variables  is fully
with husbands  and wives both present.  Of the na-  absorbed by the fixed state effect
tional  total, 6,277  were  from the Southern  states;5 The results from the participation model are pre-
3,032 of these households lived within SMSAs, and  sented in Table 2.  The models fit the data very well
3,245 were from outside of SMSAs.  There were no  as evidenced by the rather high percentage of correct
observations  for  SMSA  residents  from  West  Vir-  predictions.  Each regression is highly significant as
ginia, South Carolina, Mississippi and Arkansas,  so  shown by the lkelihood ratio test.
these states were dropped from the analysis,6 leaving  Restrictions  were  imposed  to  restrict  the
5,326 observations, 3,032 within SMSAs and 2,294  SMSA/non-SMSA differences to an intercept shifter
from outside.  The CPS distinction between SMSA  d  sit (restricted model),  i.e., a dummy variable  (Ri = 1 if
and  non-SMSA  was  used  to  define  urban/rural  non-SMSA,  0  otherwise).  Likelihood  ratio  tests
dwellers.  A description of the variables included in  were performed to test the full versus the restricted
the analysis and their summary statistics are found  models.  The results of the likelihood ratio tests of
in Table 1. The variable definitions directly coincide  equality  of slope  coefficients  in  the participation
with CPS definitions.  equation  from  rural  to  urban  areas  show  that  the
ESTIMATION  hypothesis that the slope coefficients are equal can-
not be rejected (the test statistic, with 21 degrees of
Before the results are  discussed,  a feature  of the  freedom is X2(21) = 31.4, while the critical value at
empirical  analysis  must be introduced.  Since  the  a 5  percent  level of confidence  is X2c  (21),  .95  =
offered wage (Wi) is only observed for those women  32.67).  The differences, if any, between the parame-
who worked, equations (6)  and (7) have to be tested  ters of the labor force participation equation between
and corrected for selectivity bias (see Maddala for a  urban and rural areas are adequately  captured by an
summary treatment of these problems).  Heckman's  intercept shifter.  As can be seen in the first column
2-stage procedure  (Heckman  1974, 1976,  1979) for  of Table  2, the non-SMSA dummy  variable is not
checking  and  then  correcting  for  selectivity  was  significant in the restricted model; thus, there is little
used.  To check for selection bias, a probit equation  strong evidence of different female labor force par-
was  estimated for  the probability  of participation.  ticipation  decisions from SMSA to non-SMSA  ar-
The inverse mills ratio is calculated  using Xi = 0(,  eas  It  should be remembered,  however,  that the
likelihood  ratio  test  reported  above  came  close to
Zi*)/(Zi,  Zi*)  where  0  is  the density  and  1D  the  rejecting the equality of slopes across rural and urban
distribution of the probit index.  The computed Xi is  areas.  In summary, differences in parameters across
then  entered  into  the regression equations  for the  rural and urban areas were tested by comparing the
SThese states are:  Alabama,  Arkansas, Florida,  Georgia, Kentucky,  Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,  North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia,  West Virginia.
6These states cannot be included since the variables  Si and Si *  Ri will be perfectly collinear for these four states.
52Table 1.  Description of Variables  and Summary Statistics
Non-SMSA  (Ri = 1)  SMSA (Ri = 0)
Variable  Description  (N =  2,294)  (N  =  3,032)
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.
Employment  Satus  Dummy = 1 if employed  .45  .50  .49  .50
Hours  Annualized hours workedc  1,873.30  545.85  1,868.50  569.86
Wage  Hourly equivalent wage  4.27  5.04  5.06  3.86
Agea  Age of female (in years)  44.35  15.92  43.59  15.18
Highest gradea  Highest grade of education
completed  12.25  2.94  13.33  2.75
Highest grade
squareda  158.80  68.59  185.11  71.58
Husband's highest
gradea  12.00  3.73  13.54  3.50
Racea  Dummy  = 1 if non-white  .10  .30  .16  .33
Lagged  Dummy  = 1 if female
participation  worked in prior year  .50  .50  .52  .50
Child < 1b  Number of children less
than  1 year old in family  .05  .22  .05  .21
Child 2-6
" Children from 2-6 years  .23  .54  .23  .52
Child 7-1 2b  Children from 7-12 years  .35  .66  .30  .63
Child  13-18b  Children between 13 and
18 years  .36  .72  .34  .71
Husband's  Wage earnings of husband,
earnings
b annualized  10,906.00  9,752.10  14,900.00  12,046.00
Unearned  Annualized unearned
Incomeb  income of family  2.939.90  5.100.40  3.318.10  6.443.00
Iancluded in Z1.
blncluded in Z1.
cComputed  using "usually weekly hours on  main job" question in  CPS,  Annualized by multiplying variable by 50.
likelihood ratio of the full versus the restricted mod-  gression  is  one means  of accounting  for dynamic
els.  The equality of slope coefficients  from rural to  life-cycle effects  (Nakamura and Nakamura  1985).
urban areas could not be rejected.  The t-test on the  Because of this, the lagged participation variable  is
restricted model  indicates that the intercept  shifter  included in the participation model used to check for
for SMSA vs non-SMSA  is not significant.  selectivity in the wage and hours equation.
In order to examine the effect that the inclusion of  The results of the participation model in Tables 2
the lagged participation variable had on these results,  and 3 are generally consistent with prior findings and
the model was reestimated while excluding this vari-  with expectations.  More education raises the prob-
able.  The results with lagged participation variable  ability of working.  The education effect is concave,
deleted are  shown  in Table  3.  In this model,  the  though the marginal effect is positive throughout the
hypothesis  that the urban-rural  participation  struc-  relevant range of the variable.  This concave effect
ture is equal is strongly rejected (X 2 (20) = 52.4; X2 reinforces  the  notion  that  non-linear  effects  are
(20), .95 = 31.41).  This provides evidence that there  needed to effectively model the impact of education
are strong persistent effects in the female labor force  on labor force decisions.  Few other studies examine
participation  decision  (individual  heterogeneity);  the non-linear effects of education  on participation
when these effects are  accounted for (by including  and use  instead  a  linear term,  which is  generally
lagged participation) there are only a few differences  found  to  be  positive  (Nakamura  and  Nakamura
between  rural  and urban  areas  in  the decision  to  1981; Nakamura et al.  1979).  Age effects are simi-
participate by married women.  When these persist-  larly concave.  Age has a positive impact on female
ent effects are not accounted  for, then large strong  labor force participation until 33.6 years,  when the
differences  in participation  across rural  and urban  likelihood of labor force participation begins declin-
areas exist.  Entering  lagged participation in the re-  ing.  This  is largely  consistent with prior research
53Table 2.  Probit results for labor force participationa
SMSA / Non-SMSA Constrained Equal  SMSA / Non-SMSA Allowed to Vary
Explanatory Variable  (Restricted  Model)  (Full Model)
SMSA  Non-SMSA
-3.1771  -1.6464  -4.8025
Intercept  (-6.66)  (-2.42)  (-6.71)
-.5570  -0.6306  -. 4721
Child  < 1  (-5.25)  (-4.33)  (-2.99)
-.1992  -0.1191  -. 2869
Child 2-6  (-3.94)  (-1.75)  (-3.72)
-.0836  -.0963  -.0759
Child 7-12  (-2.12)  (-1.76)  (-1.31)
-.1054  -.0687  -.1368
Child  13-18  (-2.87)  (-1.36)  (-2.51)
-.0421  -.0215  -.1039
Husband's  Earningsb  (-1.51)  (-.36)  (-2.10)
-.1018  -.0316  -.3524
Unearned Incomeb  (-1.93)  (-.51)  (-2.81)
.0599  .0440  .0800
Age  (4.31)  (2.40)  (3.68)
-.00089  -. 00073  -.0011
Age Squared  (-5.48)  (-3.43)  (-4.19)
.1547  .0180  .3224
Highest Grade  (2.71)  (-.22)  (3.68)
.00438  -. 00204  -. 0112
Highest Grade Squared  (-2.01)  (.66)  (-3.22)
Lagged participation  2.4799  2.5632  2.4035
(46.98)  (35.27)  (28.87)
.3175  .3866  .1674
Race  (4.10)  (3.93)  (1.29)
-. 00761  -.0190  .00741




.0243  -.0203  .0244
Maryland  (.21)  (-.15)  (.10)
-.0992  -.2096  .1995
Virginia  (-.93)  (-1.56)  (1.06)
.1172  .0718  .2243
North Carolina  (1.08)  (.46)  (1.47)
.0754  .0612  .1850
Georgia  (.70)  (0.39)  (1.21)
.1393  .0678  .2800
Florida  (1.44)  (0.54)  (1.77)
Kentucky  -. 0995  -.1259  -. 0149
(-.87)  (-.72)  (-.10)
.1349  .1167  .2193
Tennessee  (1.17)  (.72)  (1.27)
-.2073  -.3173  -.0324
Alabama  (-1.84)  (-2.13)  (-1.19)
N  5,236  5,236
LR c 4,277.5  4,246.2
(p value)  .000  .000
Percent correct predictionsd  .902  .903
aAsympotic t-statistics in parentheses.  Deleted  state fixed effect is Louisiana.
bin $10.000.
"This  likelihood  ratio tests indicates the overall significance of the regression. It is analogous to the overall F-test for a
linear regression. 
dTotal correct predictions (i.e., cases where P,,  Pi = 1,  plus cases where PI  =  0, P,  =  0, where P,  is the predicted
participation for the ith  person and P.  is actual participation) divided by the total number of observations.
54Table 3. Probit Results for Labor  Force Participation with Lagged Participation Excludeda
SMSA / Non-SMSA  SMSA / Non-SMSA
Explanatory Variable  Constrained Equal  Allowed to Vary
SMSA  Non-SMSA
Intercept  -1.4961  -.2702  -2.727
(-4.23)  (-0.54)  (-5.14)
Child < 1  -.6501  -0.7156  -0.5340
(-7.33)  (-5.94)  (-4.03)
Child 2-6  -.5786  -0.5906  -0.5677
(-14.43)  (-11.04)  (-9.23)
Child 7-12  -.1950  -0.2035  0.1850
(-6.43)  (-4.94)  (-4.08)
Child  13-18  -.1443  -0.1591  -0.11670
(-5.16)  (-4.29)  (-2.71)
Husband's Earningsb  -.1387  -0.1197  -0.1903
(-6.56)  (-4.61)  (-4.95)
Unearned Incomeb  -.3408  -0.2299  -0.67612
(-8.04)  (-4.64)  (-7.16)
Age  .0784  .0647  .0967
(7.48)  (4.69)  (5.92)
Age Squared  -.0001  -.0012  -. 0014
(-10.99)  (-7.65)  (-7.75)
Highest Grade  .0814  .00004  0.1295
(1.94)  (0.001)  (1.99)
Highest Grade  .0008  .0041  -.0013
Squared  (0.52)  (1.86)  (-0.49)
Race  .4106  0.4014  0.3588
(6.89)  (5.45)  (3.46)
Husband's  Highest  -0.0035  -.0276  .0270
Grade  (-.45)  (-2.60)  (2.28)
Non-SMSA  -.0278
(-.67)
Maryland  .1190  .0217  0.2094
(1.38)  (0.21)  (1.03)
Virginia  .1352  -.0072  0.4270
(1.65)  (-0.07)  (2.89)
North Carolina  .3554  0.1181  0.6440
(4.34)  (1.01)  (5.32)
Georgia  .1818  .0666  0.3919
(2.23)  (0.57)  (3.270)
Florida  .1599  .0196  0.4104
(2.18)  (0.21)  (3.37)
Kentucky  -.0052  -0.1978  0.2428
(-.06)  (-1.52)  (1.93)
Tennessee  .2064  .0868  0.4218
(2.36)  (0.73)  (3.17)
Alabama  -.0019  -.0779  0.1446
(-.02)  (-0.68)  (1.07)
N  5,231  5,236
LR C 1,473.8  1,526.3
(p  value)  .000  .000
Percent correct  .704  .710
predictionsd
aAsymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Deleted state fixed effect is Louisiana.
bin $10,000
CThis  likelihood ratio tests indicates the overall significance of the regression. It is analogous to the overall F-test for a
linear regression.  A  A
"Total correct predictions (i.e., cases where  P,,  Pi = 1,  plus cases where P,  =  0, P,  =  0, where P,  is the predicted
participation for the ith person  and Pi  in the actual participation) divided by  total number of observations.
55(Nakamura  and Nakamura  1981;  Nakamura  et al.  tested  using  a Bera-Jarque  Skewness-Kurtosis  test
1979).  described on pp. 453-454 of Spanos.  Heteroskedas-
The effects  of the presence  of children  on labor  ticity was tested using White's test described in pp.
force participation are extremely strong and consis-  466-467 of Spanos.  The OLS reduced form wage
tent with previously published results (Huffman and  and hours  equations passed tests of normality,  and
Lang; Nakamura  and Nakamura  1981).  The pres-  showed no signs of heteroskedasticity. 8
ence of children aged less than 6 years had a strong
negative  effect on labor force participation by mar-  Structural Wage Equation
ried females.  Children between 7  and  12 years of The structural wage equation (equation 7)was es-
age had a smaller, but still negative effect. The effects.  othhutimated with predicted hours used as an instrument
The effects of the husband's earned  and family's  to identify theendogenoushou  worked.  The initial
unearned income on female labor force participation  e ia .~ . „ ..  imposed identifying restriction is a_ = 0  (see equa- are negative  yet not statistically significant.  This
might be explained by an early decision in the life-  tion7),orthat Z  only affects labordemandthrough
its impact  on hours worked  (supply).  Next,  Bas- cycle by the women to participate or not; continued  its impact  on hours worked  (supply).  Next, Bas-
participation by her is unaffected  by small changes  mann tests of over-identifying  restrictions  {al  = 0,
in either  the husband's  wage  or family  unearned  a  = Q,  a4 = Q  were conducted,  to see if rural-urban
income.  When the variable representing lagged par-  effects on the demand side could be fully captured
ticipation  is  deleted  both these  variables  become  by an intercept  shifter.9 This hypothesis that rural-
negative and strongly significant  (see Table 3).  urban effects on the demand side can be fully cap-
The differences in results with lagged participation  tured by  an intercept shifter could not be rejected
included and excluded may be interpreted as indicat-  {F(21, 2172) = .6150}.  Thus, the effects of rural-ur-
ing that the impacts of the explanatory variables on  ban differences  in labor demand  were  captured  in
the decision to participate of women in rural areas  two different ways. First, any systematic rural-urban
are very different from those in urban areas.  How-  difference  in labor supply by married females was
ever, once a woman decides to participate or not, the  captured during the identification of the endogenous
decision to continue to participate or to remain out  hours  variable,  whereas  rural-urban  differences  in
of the workforce  is the same in both rural and urban  labor demand were captured by an intercept shifter
areas.  and by any variation in the response to hours from
rural to urban areas.  The t-test for the coefficient on
Reduced Form Wage and Hours Equation  hi * Ri indicated that there is no differential demand
In order  to  test for  sample  selection  bias  in  the  response to hours from rural to urban  areas.  This
structural  regime,  the  inverse  mills  ratio  (>i)  was  variable was then deleted.
calculated  and  entered  into  reduced-form  regres-  The final 2SLS estimation of the wage equation is
sions of the wage and hour equations.  These regres-  presented in Table 5. Model 1 contains the estimates
sions  included  slope  shifters  for  non-SMSA  with  hi  * Ri  included,  and  Model  2  contains  the
residence.  The results,  presented in Table 4,  show  version with this variable  excluded.  Once  the de-
that selection bias does not exist in either the hours  mand response to hours worked is held constant from
equation or the log wage regression.7 Because selec-  rural to urban areas,  the impact  of SMSA vs. non-
tion bias is not deemed  to be a problem,  the (log)  SMSA status  (Ri) becomes  significant.  The model
wage and hours reduced forms were then estimated  results show clearly that  labor demand differences
by OLS  (i.e., without  a selectivity  correction)  and  between urban and rural areas can be captured by the
checked for the statistical assumptions of normality  intercept shifter (non-SMSA)  which was highly sig-
and  homoskedasticity  (Spanos).  Normality  was  nificant. '°
7The results in Table 4 were calculated  using the "Heckit" 2-step procedure (see Heckman  1979 and Maddala,  pp. 231-236).
The reported standard errors are corrected as Heckman recommended.  This correction procedure is described in Heckman (1979)
and Madalla.  The significance of the Xi in Table 4 determines whether  selectivity bias is important.  Beyond this,  Xi has no real
significance in this model.
8These results are available from the authors on request.
9The basic logic behind the Basmann tests follows.  The model is estimated using 2SLS with all the over-identifying  restrictions
imposed.  The residuals from this regression (calculated using the actual  endogenous right-hand side variable)  are then regressed on
the entire instrument set (with the predicted log (wage) and predicted hours not included).  Tests are then conducted for the exclusion
of the over-identifying  variables from this second regression.  See Mroz  for a similar application of the Basmann test.
lOAltematively,  Ri could have been deleted and the hi *  Ri included.  Both sets results (with Ri in and hi *  Ri out; and with Ri out
and hi *  Ri included) indicate strong differences  in demand from rural to urban areas.
56Table 4.  Reduced form wage  and hours equation used to test for sample selection biasa
Dependent Variable
Variable  In  Wage  Hours
Intercept  .568  1,507.55
(2.37)  (4.42)
Child < 1  .063  -85.9
(1.02)  (-.98)
Child 2-6  .051  -189.64
(1.98)  (-5.20)
Child  7-12  -. 036  -77.08
(-2.04)  (-3.04)
Child  13-18  -. 026  -15.26
(-1.57)  (-.66)
Husband's Earningsb  .046  -62.74
(3.77)  (-3.64)
Unearned  Incomeb  .072  -77.53
(2.50)  (-1.89)
Age  .025  17.30
(3.76)  (1.83)
Age Squared  -. 00025  -.28
(-3.01)  (-2.42)
Highest Grade  -. 031  43.04
(-1.09)  (1.08)
Highest Grade Squared  .306  -. 86
(3.07)  (-.61)
Race  -. 014  -18.69
(-.44)  (-.43)
Husband's Highest Grade  .010  -5.93
(2.11)  (-.89)
Non-SMSA  .412  394.77
(1.07)  (.72)
X  -.985  -113.29
(-.88)  (-.72)
State Effectsc
Maryland  .120  -59.23
(2-80)  (-.97)
Virginia  .039  69.01
(.91)  (1.12)
North Carolina  .-. 085  115.24
(-1.78)  (1.69)
Georgia  .-. 019  -18.45
(.39)  (-.27)
Florida  -. 054  72.58
(-1.32)  (1.26)
Kentucky  -. 047  -109.95
(-.83)  (-1.37)
Tennessee  -. 020  -.87
(-.40)  (-.01)
Alabama  -.021  22.24
(-.40)  (.30)
N  2,216  2,216
R2  .221  .059
aNon-SMSA-variable  interactions not shown to conserve space. T-statistics (in  parentheses)  are computed using
corrected  standard errors (see footnote 7).
bin $10,000
CDeleted state fixed effect is Louisiana.
57Table 5.  Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates  of Wage Equationa
Dependent Variable = log (wage)
Explanatory Variable  Parameter Estimates  Parameter Estimates
Model 1  Model 2
Intercept  1.16  1.16
(4.96)  (5.24)
Hoursb  -.0277  -.0279
(-3.23)  (-3.59)
R *  Hoursb  -.00097
(-.07)
Age  .0266  .0265
(5.26)  (5.30)
Age  Squared  -.00029  -.00029
(-4.58)  (-4.62)
Highest Grade  -.03593  -.03591
(-1.56)  (-1.56)
Highest Grade Squared  .00351  .00351
(4.24)  (4.24)
Race  -.0433  -.0432
(-1.75)  (-1.75)
Husband's Highest Grade  .00834  .00835
(2.17)  (2.18)
Non-SMSA  -.05791  -.0761
(-.22)  (-3.93)
State Effectsd
Maryland  .09501  .0949
(2.30)  (2.30)
Virginia  .03529  .03532
(.90)  (.90)
North  Carolina  -.04383  -.0436
(-1.14)  (1.14)
Georgia  -.0252  -.02534
(-.65)  (-.65)
Florida  -.05344  -.05301
(-1.46)  (-1.47)
Kentucky  -.05831  -.0578
(-1.30)  (-1.31)
Tennessee  -.04664  -.0464
(-1.12)  (-1.12)
Alabama  -.05585  -.05591
(-1.28)  (-1.28)
N  2,216  2,216
R2  .077  .078
aT-statistics in parentheses.
bEndogenous variable in  100  hours annually.
CTests  for structural differences from  rural to urban areas failed to reject over-identifying restrictions.
( arl  = 0,  ar2 =  0  a4 =  0 ), F  (20,2175) =  .617.
dLouisiana is the deleted  state effect.
Demand differences between states are captured in  all have their expected signs.  Wages increase with
both models  by  the  fixed  state effects,  which are  age up to age 46  when they begin  to decline;  this
jointly significant at the .05 level.  The relatively low  concave profile is consistent with other studies (e.g.,
R2 is not unusual with cross-sectional data  (see, for  Huffman and Lange, who use experience rather than
example,  Tokle and Huffman).  The variables  in Zi  age).  Education  has a positive  effect;  though the
58linear term is negative, it is not significantly different  SMSA/non-SMSA  dummy  are  endogenous  vari-
from zero,  and the squared term has  a significant  ables in the hours equations  (see the simultaneous
positive  effect.  Employers  pay significantly  more  system (3)  and (4)); therefore, an identifying restric-
for  more  highly  educated  employees.  Using  the  tion was needed.  The exogenous variables excluded
point estimates of the coefficients, additional educa-  from  this  estimation  was  Zi  and  the  interactions
tion beyond grade five leads to higher wages.  Race  between Ri and 74* and Si.  Si was also excluded from
does not have a significant  impact  on wages.  The  this first regression (i.e.,  supply was not allowed to
highly significant ruralurban dummy shows that at  vary by state of residence).  The exclusion of Si from
the mean wage,  rural married female workers earn  the supply  equations  was the first  overidentifying
7.6 percent lower hourly wages than urban workers.  restriction  tested.  The  test  statistic  (F(8,2175)  =
The negative sign on the hours variable (hi)  in this  2.44,  Fc,.05 (8,2175)  = 1.94) indicated  strong rejec-
equation  is  an interesting  result.  Some argue that  tion.  Thus, Si was entered as a supply determinant.
employers  will  be  willing  to  provide  a  premium  The  results  from  this model, where  supply  was
wage for full-time workers, and thus, the sign of this  allowed to vary by state of residence,  (Model 1) are
variable should be expected to be positive.  Blank  shown in the first column of Table 6.  A Basmann
(1990) found using CPS data and controlling for the  test of the over-identifying restrictions  (br  = Q,  b3r
choice  of  full  versus  part-time  employment,  that  = 0, b4r =  0) used in Model  1, leads to a marginal
part-time  workers received  higher wages than full-  rejection (F(20,2175)  = 1.62, critical value = 1.57)
time workers.  The evidence here  is that full-time  of these restrictions."  This rejection provides some
wages  are,  on  average,  lower.  There  are several  evidence of a systematic difference in labor supply
plausible explanations.  Full-time employees receive  behavior between rural and urban areas.
benefits  other  than wages,  and thus,  their money  In  order  to  further  examine  the  source  of these
wages might be lower.  Second,  once the determi-  systematic supply differences,  Basmann tests of in-
nants of hours supplied and labor force participation  dividual  groups of coefficients  were conducted.  A
along with the human capital determinants of wages  Basmann test of the over-identifying restriction that
are controlled for, firms pay less for full-time work-  the coefficients on Zi* do not vary from rural to urban
ers whose marginal productivity  might be lower.  A  areas (i.e., b2r = 0) lead to rejection of the restriction
final explanation is thatmost of thevariation inhours  (F(6,2175) = 2.53, critical value = 2.10).  The model
worked  is  among  workers  who  already  might be  was then  respecified  with  the  Zi*  coefficients  al-
classified as part-time workers, and among part-time  lowed  to vary  across  the rural-urban  designation.
workers,  premiums  are  paid  for  people  who  are  These results are presented as Model 2 in Table 6.
willing  to  work short hours on flexible  schedules.  Further tests of over-identifying  restrictions (b3r =
These issues are beyond the scope of this study, but  0;  b4r = 0) failed to reject the null hypothesis of no
are certainly  subjects for future studies.  The nega-  differences  between  urban and  rural  areas  for the
tive coefficient on hours suggests that in the southern  variables  Zi and  Si  respectively.  Because no addi-
United  States, women  are willing  to  accept  lower  tional over-identifying restrictions could be rejected,
wages for longer hours worked.  Model 2 was selected as the best model. 2 A test for
The estimation  of  the wageRi  * ln(wage) failed to reject; the column
sight about how wages vary between rural and urban  lable  deleed.  he ev e is thatthewi  this vasi-
areas.  This variation can be fully captured by differ-  abledeleted  Theevidencethatthereare  ni
ences, if any, in labor supplies and by a single inter-  cant  differences  in  female  labo  supply  behavior
acr  oss  rur  al  and urban areas, and that these  di  ffer  - cept shifter.  There  is no independent  variation  in  across rural and urban areas,  and that these differ-
labor  demand  across  rural/urban  designation  be-  ences cannot be explained solely by differences  in
tween  states y  , nr ae te  d  nces  wages. These differences also cannot be captured by
tween states (tested by a4'),  nor are there differences  a simple  intercept  shifter; the slopes of the coeffi-
in slopes of the other variables (Zi, AZ).  cients of Z4*  vary across the ruralurban designation.
The parameter  estimates resulting from Model 3
Structural Supply  Equation  are broadly consistent with those from other studies,
The first specification used for the hours supplied  except that the supply determinants (Zi*) show vari-
was:  hours = f (Z*, log (wage) log (wage) * Ri, Ri).  ation  from rural  to urban  areas.  The existence of
The  log  of the  wage  and  its  interaction  with  the  children in the family leads to fewer hours supplied,
"1  This test examines whether Ri *  Zi*, Ri *  Si, and Ri *  Zi can be used as instruments for log (wage).  If they cannot, then they, or
some subset of them should be used as regressors in the hours supplied equation.
12The result that  22r  * Q  was robust to the order of testing of the three restrictions (o2r = Q,  b3r = Q, b4r  = Q).
59Table 6.  Two-stage Least-squares Results for Hours  Supplieda
Explanatory Variable  Model  1 b  Model 2c  Model  3d
Intercept  1,757.98  1,749.02  1,727.71
(13.40)  (13.06)  (14.74)
1  n(wage)e  173.94  206.33  222.64
(1.94)  (2.20)  (2.80)
Ri * ln(wage)e 168.90  55.73
(1.21)  (.33)
Child < 1  -56.98  -43.87  -44.82
(-.94)  (-.54)  (-.56)
Child 2-6  -130.48  -157.41  -157.83
(-4.89)  (-4.48)  (-4.49)
Child  7-12  -1.16  -40.16  -39.58
(-.06)  (-1.62)  (-1.60)
Child  13-18  16.66  1.20  1.56
(.06)  (.06)  (.07)
Husband's  Earningsf -54.69  -74.66  -76.48
(-3.58)  (-4.06)  (-4.36)
Unearned  Incomef 209.51  -177.84  -179.57
(-6.08)  (-4.53)  (-4.62)
Non-SMSA  -230.05  -186.07  -117.64
(-1.18)  (-.87)  (-2.22)
State Effects
Maryland  -104.94  16.95  -102.15
(-1.87)  (.27)  (-1.84)
Virginia  55.97  .80  54.39
(1.08)  (.01)  (1.05)
North Carolina  58.10  75.40  61.86
(1.13)  (1.09)  (1.22)
Georgia  29.43  -46.35  25.74
(.56)  (-.66)  (.49)
Florida  9.45  69.77  17.59
(.20)  (1.19)  (.36)
Kentucky  -114.88  2.85  -106.19
(-1.96)  (.04)  (-1.82)
Tennessee  -8.29  14.93  -8.58
(-.15)  (.21)  (-.16)
Alabama  16.43  -11.79  13.94
(.28)  (-.164)  (.24)
R  * child < 1  -27.12  -24.58
(-.22)  (-.20)
R * child 2-6  69.75  72.18
(1.30)  (1.36)
R *  child 7-12  91.91  90.42
(2.43)  (2.41)
R* child 13-18  -3.22  -4.02
(-.10)  (-.12)
R *  husband's earnings  63.47  69.45
(1.92)  (2.51)
R  * unearned income  - -101.76  -94.60
(-1.26)  (-1.21)
N  2,216  2,216  2,216
___________________2  .048  .062  .066
T-Stastistics are in parentheses. Louisiana is the deleted state effect.
bOver-identifying restrictions imposed for Model 1  are coefficients on Z, Z*, and state residence, do not vary from rural
to urban areas. Test of these restrictions F(20,2175) = 1.52. Thus, the restriction are marginally rejected.
COver-identifying  restrictions imposed for Model 2 are coefficients on Z, and state fixed effects do not vary from  rural to
urban areas. A test of over-identifying restrictions involving Z* leads to F(6,2175) = 2.53. Thus, the restrictions is
rejected.
dOver-identifying restrictions imposed for Model  3 are that the coefficients on Z and state fixed effects do not vary from
rural to urban areas. None of these restrictions were rejected.
eEndogenous variable.
fin  $10,000.  60income effects are strongly negative, indicating that  intercept  shifter,  and  supply  differences  included
leisure is a normal good,  and the wage effect falls  some slopes that varied from urban to rural areas.
somewhere  in  the  middle  of the  studies  cited  in  The differences  in labor supplies were manifested
Mroz.  The interesting  part of the results relates to  in  several  ways.  First,  the  existence  of children
the differences in labor supply parameters from rural  between 7 and  12 years old had a positive effect on
to urban areas.  These differences can help to identify  labor  supply in  rural  areas.  In urban  areas  these
constraints  to  labor  supply,  or  differences  which  children caused fewer hours to be supplied.  Child
rural areas might face.  First, women in non-SMSA  care may  be less of a constraint  in rural  areas  for
areas  supply  significantly  fewer  hours  than those  several  reasons.  Manufacturing,  a major employer
from SMSA.  in rural areas, may allow couples to work alternate
A second difference emerges from the positive sign  shifts.  Because rural families are less mobile, other
of the coefficient associated with the Ri * Child 7-12  family members may be nearby to provide child care.
variable.  The positive sign of this coefficient shows  Additionally,  given  lower  rural  crime  rates,  rural
that  the  presence  of children  of these  ages  has  a  families may feel more secure about latch-key chil-
smaller  negative  effect  on hours  supplied  in  rural  dren.  Finally,  when their children are  school age,
areas than in urban areas.  In fact, the magnitude of  rural  women  may  choose to work in order  to  de-
the parameter estimate for R * Child 7-12 shows that  crease isolation.
children  of this age  group actually  have a positive  , 
Second, income effects were weaker in rural areas. effect on married female labor supply in rural areas.  '  ' Husband's earnings are a strong substitute for wives' There are a number of plausible explanations for this, earnings  in urban  areas.  This  is not  true in rural one being  that child  care  is less of a constraint to  i  i  nt true  in areas.  The absence of enriching alternative uses of labor supplies in rural areas than in urban areas.  This
women's time in rural areas may help explain this, needs to be examined more carefully in a study that  t  m 
contains  information  on the distance  to  child care
facilities;  these data are not available in the  Familyunearnedincomehas a morenegativeimpact fa  .cilities;  '  these.  don  women's hours in rural areas than in urban areas The differences between income effects across ru-  (  . i  ir  i  i- i^,.  '  TTi,  (Table 6).  Even though this difference is not statis- ral and urban areas also merit discussion.  Husband's  tall  gn  ant  t  differences  in tically significant,  it, combined with differences  min earned income has virtually no effect on labor supply 
,*  *^  *'~  *^~  i~  'responses  to  earned  income,  shows  differences  min in rural areas, while it has a strongly negative effect  how rural and urban families react to unearned an '  . .c  r  i r'i  •  how rural and urban families react to unearned and m urban areas.  The net effect of total family income  earned income.
(husband's earned plus family unearned income) on
female labor supply in rural areas is dampened  to a  Third, the state of residence has strong effects on
large degree  by  this difference.  Given  the lower  labor force participation by  women.  These effects
average household income in rural areas, this weaker  may include variation in labor laws, differing indus-
income effect is consistent with the observation that  trial mixes and differential access to job training and
lower  income  households  are  less  likely  to  lower  child  care.  Though these variations are not exam-
their labor supplies as income rises than are higher  ined in detail in the study, the significant fixed state
income  households.  A second  explanation is that  effects show some major differences.  Labor demand
there are  fewer activities to substitute for women's  and labor supply also differed across the states in the
work time in rural areas.  Without these alternatives,  South.  Particularly,  labor  supply  varied  signifi-
wealthier  women  continue  to  work in rural  areas.  cantly  from  state  to state; state policies  can affect
Both of these can be investigated in future research.  female labor supplies.
The study outlines  several new areas of research.
The data do not permit use of location-specific  vari-
SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS  ables that show variation within the state.  County-
This paper provides evidence on the labor supply  level  unemployment  rates,  child-care  facilities,
of married females in the southern  U.S.  There are  educational opportunities, etc., all may affect partici-
differences in this behavior between rural and urban  pation,  demand,  and supply.  The impacts of these
areas.  Some of these differences  are caused by de-  variables  should be examined.  The effects of fixed
mand side effects, but differences in supply behavior  costs  of work, job  search,  etc.  also  could  not be
also  exist.  There  was no measurable  difference  in  examined given data limitations.  These variables all
differential  participation  rates  between  urban  and  might have a different effect on labor markets in rural
rural areas  though the parameters  affecting  overall  versus urban areas.  Their effects should be exam-
participation  were  different  between  these  areas.  ined within a framework  similar to that used in this
Demand differences were found to be captured by an  study.
61The paper shows that studies of labor supplies need  be given  to  these  differences,  and the method  of
to  consider  the  obvious  potential  differences  be-  empirical analysis should be flexible with respect to
tween  labor  supplies  of  married  females  in  rural  these differences.
areas and urban areas.  Careful consideration should
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